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RICHARD DOYLE and JERRY McCAFFERY 
The Budget Enforcement Act in 1991: 
Isometric Budgeting 
The immediate effect of the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990 was to cancel a 
pending $110 billion sequester and to change the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit 
targets. These and other changes allowed Congress and the administration to escape 
responsibility for increases in the deficit if discretionary spending was kept within the 
caps and no new entitlement programs or revenue enhancements were added. This 
assumption and others relating to the empowerment of the Appropriations Committees 
and the new authority of the OMB are explored in this article. 
Although the first full year of budgeting is under the Budget Enforcement Act of 
1990 (BEA) saw neither the summits nor the threatened sequesters common in the 
previous decade, it was characterized by prolonged and sometimes bitter conflict 
between Congress and the president. In a sense, the development of the budget in 1991 
can be considered an isometric event. The struggle involved in meeting the new 
requirements of the BEA resulted in no significant changes to the budget priorities or 
problems in place before the Act took effect, and the budget cycle was marked more 
by exertion against new restraints than by movement toward new initiatives. 
The BEA became law in the fall of 1990, as Title 13 of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OMB). 1 Its immediate effect was to cancel a pending $110 
billion sequester. It also changed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) deficit targets, 
shifting from rigid deficit reduction enforced by the threat of massive across-the-board 
cuts to a new approach characterized by spending control. Caps were placed on dis-
cretionary spending, entitlement and revenue expenditures were held to a deficit neutral 
standard, and a new and more discriminating role was given to OMB in the sequester 
process. 
Other significant changes made by the BEA were as follows. 
1. Removing the threat of an across-the-board or general sequestration by generously ex-
panding the deficit targets and allowing for further upward adjustments as economic or 
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technical factors warrant. This is "no fault" budgeting in the sense that increases in the 
deficit are attributed to factors over which Congress and the president are thought to have 
minimal control, or for which they accept a lesser degree of responsibility. 
2. Dividing the discretionary portion of the budget into separate categories with spending 
caps for each through 1992. If spending exceeds the caps, OMB was to sequester the 
offending accounts to bring them within the cap. The establishment in advance of spend-
ing totals for discretionary accounts seemed to settle a major portion of fundamental 
"guns versus butter" budget policy before the annual budget process began, promising 
a relatively speedy and conflict-free session in 1991. 
3. Putting entitlements on a pay-as-you-go basis. Current programs would be maintained, 
growing with demographic trends or in dollars as the result of inflation, but new programs 
must be offset either with new taxes or cuts in existing entitlement programs. This is an 
important, though very limited, first effort to contain spending in the mandatory accounts. 
4. Requiring the concurrence of the president on emergency spending exempt from the 
spending caps. This provision enables OMB to bargain effectively with Congress over 
individual items in supplemental appropriations bills, approximately a line-item veto. 
If one outcome of these changes was to blur responsibility for increases in the deficit, 
others might include a more timely and honest budget process. Absent the possibility 
of a major sequester, the impetus for budget gimmickry seemed diminished. Congress 
and the administration would escape responsibility for increases in the deficit if dis-
cretionary spending were kept within the caps and no new entitlement programs or 
revenue enhancements were added. 
With separate caps on the three discretionary categories and a prohibition against 
moving funds between them, allocational battles between defense and discretionary 
domestic players seemed preempted. Moreover, the Appropriations Committees en-
joyed the prospect that they could accomplish their tasks without concern that increases 
in mandatory spending would overturn their decisions in the latter stages of the budget 
process, making moot all their prior effort at spending control. 
Thus the power of the Appropriations Committees was apparently enhanced and that 
of the Budget Committees and Ways and Means and Finance diluted. OMB's new 
authority to make technical changes in the deficit and to administer mini-sequesters 
appeared to strengthen its role. With macro-budget decisions in place, the stage was set 
for a relatively tranquil budget cycle during the first full year under the BEA. This 
articJe evaluates that year and explores these assumptions about the new budget pro-
cess. 
THE DEFICIT GROWS ..• AND GROWS 
A deficit for FY 1991 was the largest in history, though smaller than it would have been 
without the BEA, and it did not prove to be a disruptive issue in the budget process. 
In July, OMB Director Richard Darman's letter of transmittal for the Mid-Session 
Review of the budget made four points: 
4 
1. The economic forecast used in developing the president's budget had been "highly 
accurate to date," requiring only slight modification in the Mid-Session Review. 
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2. There had been a "marked improvement in the deficit outlook for 1991, ''principally due 
to changes in deposit insurance and military operations funding (which would make the 
deficit worse in 1992). 
3. The budget reforms of 1990 were having the intended effect and the major changes in 
estimates had been made in areas outside the scope of new budget rules, e.g., deposit 
insurance. 
4. The trend in the structural deficit remained favorable. 2 
When the Mid-Session Review was transmitted on July 15, 1991, the budget process 
had been relatively routine. The president's budget was delivered on schedule, the 
congressional budget resolution was passed in May, and when Congress recessed in 
early August, the House had passed all thirteen appropriations bills and the Senate had 
passed seven. 3 Contrary to Capitol Hill practice, a year-end crunch was unlikely. 
The Mid-Session Review noted that a previously anticipated deficit of $318 billion 
for FY 1991 would drop to $282 billion, while the FY 1992 deficit of $280.9 billion 
would jump nearly $70 billion, to $348.3 billion. Under GRH, an increase of this 
magnitude in the projected deficit for the budget that Congress was developing would 
have been nothing short of a political catastrophe. These changes were the result of the 
flow across fiscal year boundaries of funds to pay Desert Shield/Desert Storm and 
deposit insurance costs. Disregarding these technical adjustments, the anticipated def-
icit for FY 1991 drops to $222.7 billion and for FY 1992 to $213.5 billion. While 
February estimates had actually projected a surplus of $19.9 billion in FY 1996, the 
Mid-Session Review estimated a,deficit of $55.5 billion for FY 1996.4 
At the end of the fiscal year, the deficit totaled $268. 7 billion, $13 billion below the 
prediction for FY 1991, but still the largest deficit in American fiscal history. The FY 
1991 deficit was 4.8 percent of Gl'lt>, slightly above the average 1980s deficit of 4.1 
percent. For the post-World War II period, the average U.S. deficit was 1.6 percent of 
GNP, while the 1980s saw deficits rising to 6.3 percent of GNP in 1983 and 5 percent 
or higher from 1984-86.5 
However, with the threat of sequestration removed, the FY 1992 deficit stimulated 
no budget summit, no hurried internal departmental cut-back scenarios, and very little 
media interest. As the budget year concluded, Allen Schick noted: 
What is most remarkable about the deterioration in the deficit outlook is that it has occa-
sioned no response in either the executive or the legislative branches. The age of no-fault 
budgeting has arrived. Nobody is to blame for the deficit, and nobody has to do anything 
about it. 
Sometime between August and September, the budget process, which had been 
tracking so nicely, stalled. The delay stemmed from a dispute over the appropriate way 
to ameliorate the plight of the unemployed while simultaneously retaining the structure 
of discipline entailed in the BEA. As the economy stagnated, Congress and the pres-
ident were under pressure to extend unemployment benefits. Tax receipts for 1990 and 
1991 came in more slowly than anticipated and economic growth was lower than 
estimated, while interest rates remained higher until late in 1991. Consequently, in-
terest costs to the government approached the $200 billion mark. With defense budgets 
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declining, interest on the debt threatened to become the largest single item in the 
budget, indicating how "Washington's continuing problems are tied to past deficit 
spending. " 7 
In October, Congressman Leon Panetta, Chairman of the House Budget Committee, 
announced that he was drafting a ten-year plan to get the budget process back on track 
and to reduce the deficit to 1 percent of GNP by the year 2001. 8 The key here is the 
recognition that deficit reduction is a long-term undertaking and that completely elim-
inating it by a certain date may not be a necessary or desirable policy. The two GRH 
bills of the 1980s attempted to wipe out the deficit within five years. The BEA was 
somewhat more pragmatic, aiming for an $83 billion deficit by 1995, the final year 
covered by the Act. 9 Panetta' s plan reinforced the recc __,nition that structural deficits 
demand structural solutions. A ten-year plan for solving the deficit problem marks a 
notable shift in the deficit resolution debate. 
In sum, the deficit increased, as many expected it would. The Mid-Year Revision 
revealed major changes in the near term profile of the deficit between 1991 and 1992, 
as well as some technical reestimations of moderate size. But these changes had no 
impact on the budget process, since the BEA had severed the direct link between deficit 
increases and sequestration. Emergencies-Desert Storm/Desert Shield and sharply 
increased funding requirements for the savings and loan bailout-were causing the 
turbulence, but these were outside the calculus of the BEA. Although these emergen-
cies drove the deficit up, a budget reform incapable of accommodating them would not 
have survived long. Thus substantial changes in budget policy occurred because of 
emergencies without disrupting the main budget arena, and there was very little of the 
process constriction of previous years attributable to these events. 
While envisioning deficit reduction as a long-term problem seems realistic and 
healthy for the system, it also raises an obvious danger. Policy makers might adopt the 
"deficit second theory" in order to provide fiscal stimulus in the present while con-
tinuing to imagine the future in black ink rather than red. The budget, in this view, will 
always be healed in the out years via optimistic economic assumptions or projected 
spending cuts or revenue increases which are never made to occur. 
Just as resolving the budget deficit came to be recognized as a long-term problem, 
the long-term implications of the BEA provision for entitlement programs also drew 
attention. Spending control in this portion of the budget applies only to new programs; 
those already on the books were allowed to grow as their clientele grew. If a new 
program were to be accepted within this protected area of the budget, an existing 
program had to be displaced or, in a brittle economy, revenues had to be raised. CBO' s 
ten-year baseline indicates what this struggle might entail, as well as the divergent 
paths of entitlement and discretionary spending under the BEA. 10 
While the growth of entitlement spending seems moderate on a GNP basis, it almost 
doubles on a dollar basis. And this assumes, perhaps optimistically, that the BEA's 
offset provision is upheld. If that assumption fails, the growth of mandatory spendiµg 
is likely to be even greater. By contrast, discretionary expenditures not only decline as 
a percentage of GNP, they also become a battleground among domestic discretionary 
expenditures, international affairs, and defense in 1994 and 1995. At that time if not 
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sooner, the separate discretionary categories are dissolved, and all discretionary pro-
grams must compete for funds under a single global spending cap. 
For example, in 1991, the president's plan for defense spending assumed inflation 
adjusted cuts of nearly 3 percent in 1994 and 6 percent in 1995. Unless the global cap 
on discretionary spending is raised or defense funds are shifted into the domestic and 
international categories, these two categories will experience after inflation cuts of 7 
percent in 1994 and 10 percent in 1995. 11 This situation will be exacerbated by the 
desire of Congress to increase spending rather than decrease it. 12 
It is likely that the ban on shifting funds between discretionary categories will be 
modified or dropped before it expires in 1992. The BEA's requirement that funds not 
spent within any discretionary category, notably defense, could only be used for deficit 
reduction rather than reallocated to another spending category was challenged several 
times in 1991. Attempts were made on the budget resolution and on appropriations bills 
to modify this rule. In the House, Representative Frank launched "Operation Jericho," 
intending to bring down the walls separating discretionary appropriations categories. 13 
In the other chamber, Senator Byrd, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee 
and a key participant in the negotiations that produced the BEA in 1990, urged Pres-
ident Bush to participate in 1992 in "a bipartisan agreement on changes in the BEA to 
more closely reflect the changed world environment.'' 14 
Defense will certainly be the target of further cuts. It remains to be seen how 
significant a reduction in defense spending will be acceptable to both branches of 
government, how these "savings" are allocated among competing demands for in-
creased spending for nondefense discretionary programs, tax cuts, and deficit reduc-
tion, and how other BEA spending control mechanisms will be altered as part of this 
adjustment. 
ADAPTATION TO DISCIPLINE 
While the inclination of Congress to spend was strong in 1991, discipline at the cap 
level proved surprisingly effective. Only one new entitlement program was ap-
proved-a controversial extension of unemployment benefits-and this purportedly 
met the deficit neutral requirement of the BEA. This is not to say, however, that there 
were not significant disputes over the allocation of spending within the caps, or that 
Congress did not discover ways to foil the rules at the margin. 
Four discipline avoidance strategies were attempted, with varying degrees of suc-
cess. These included declaring emergencies, holding back obligations, underfunding, 
and transforming discretionary programs into entitlements. In several instances, con-
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gressional appropriators found ways to stay within the FY 1992 caps by delaying 
obligations until the last day of the fiscal year, forcing the actual outlays into FY 1993. 
The Labor-HHS Appropriations Subcommittees delayed some $3.1 billion in spending 
authority in this fashion, which has the effect of moving $850 million in outlays into 
FY 1993. Another five subcommittees delayed another $1 billion in spending, shifting 
$600 million into FY 1993. 15 This will diminish the total amount of domestic discre-
tionary outlays available under the following year's spending cap, and exacerbate the 
problem facing supporters of increased funding in FY 1993. 16 
An attempt was made in the House to change discretionary spending for highways 
into an entitlement program. The House took a "brute-force approach" -by simply 
declaring certain highway spending as mandatory to take advantage of the protection of 
such programs offered by the BEA. 17 But the tax measure necessary to justify this 
funding was not approved. Both the House and the Senate attempted, without success, 
to convert Pell education grants to entitlements. The Senate tried to make an end run 
around the BEA by making the change take effect after the Act expires. 
According to OMB, both the House and the Senate intentionally underfunded some 
programs, hoping that if the funds were insufficient, the shortfall could be addressed 
through the emergency supplemental loophole in the BEA. Haas suggests that the 
House underfunded the FCC, while a Senate panel did the same for contract renewals 
on public housing. Another version of this strategy was to directly apply the designa-
tion of emergency to spending. A House spending bill designated $213 million in 
firefighting funds as an emergency, as did a Senate bill for $307 million in state survey 
and certification programs and unspecified costs for treaty verification. 18 
Congress could have simply scrapped the Act rather than attempting to evade it. It 
chose not to do this. An escape clause in the BEA provides for an automatic Senate vote 
on suspending the process whenever the projected growth of GNP is negative or when 
actual growth is below l percent for two consecutive quarters. The Senate was forced 
to vote three times on triggering the escape clause in 1991; it refused to suspend the 
BEA all three times. An 88-8 vote on September 19 against suspending the rules was 
as close as opponents of the BEA came to dumping it. 19 Scrapping the Act so soon after 
creating it would have been bad budget form, and there was concern that abandoning 
the rules in the first full year of their implementation would have left the process in 
chaos. ''The whole so-called budget package is really a sham,'' said Budget Commit-
tee member Senator Reigle, but "it's the only fig leaf in town-everybody's got to 
wear it.' ' 20 
OMB also displayed its capacity to manipulate the new rules designed to enforce the 
BEA. To support a new education benefit for veterans, it simply defined an entitlement 
as an appropriation, thus avoiding the pay-as-you-go requirement. In the unemploy-
ment benefit extension underfunding case, OMB employed its authority to score bills 
to rebut the charge that one of the proposed offsets was actually a shortfall. 21 In another 
instance of the same kind, it argued that administrative measures would make up an 
alleged shortfall.22 As Naomi Caiden observes, because the budget process has become 
much more complex, the task of assessing outlays and their consequences has also 
become more difficult. 23 Paul Van de Water, Chief of CBO's Projects Unit, noted the 
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increased legalism resulting from conflict over BEA rules for spending: ''An increasing 
portion of a budget analyst's time is devoted to interpreting the sometimes murky words 
of the Budget Enforcement Act, whose grimy, well-thumbed pages are taking on the 
character of holy writ. " 24 
Perhaps no issue more clearly illustrated the new dynamics of this process than the 
struggle over the extension of unemployment benefits. The issue was simple. The 
number of people who used up their jobless benefits increased from 202,581 in January 
1991 to 349, 735 by July 1991. 25 The Democrats intended to extend the time these 
people could draw benefits and make a partisan issue of it to exploit any weaknesses 
the president might have on the domestic side. The president, while sympathetic to the 
jobless, claimed that he would support the extended benefits only if they met the deficit 
neutral requirement of the BEA. The first bill addressing this issue (HR 3201) passed 
Congress on August 2, 1991. It allowed the president to designate an emergency that 
would extend benefits to workers who had exhausted their unemployment benefits. The 
president signed the bill, but refused to declare an emergency. It was law, but it was 
unfunded. 
In September, Congress again took up the unemployment benefits issue, approving 
a bill that required the president to designate an emergency that would extend benefits 
for workers who had exhausted their unemployment compensation benefits. This bill 
cleared Congress on October 1, 1991. The president vetoed it, claiming there were no 
offsets and that he would not bust the budget agreement. Congress was unable to 
override the president's veto. 26 
Thus while some committees were preparing to create emergencies and others were 
developing alternative gimmicks, they confronted a president who displayed his de-
termination to adhere to the discipline of the BEA despite the popularity of the spending 
at issue. The issue was partially obscured by the existence of an unemployment insur-
ance trust fund which held a surplus of $8 billion collected from employers to be used 
for benefits extension. 27 Democrats tended to say it was an abuse of the trust fund not 
to use it, while Republicans argued that once an emergency was declared here, they 
would be declared everywhere. 
A final effort to provide extended unemployment benefits, this time funded by 
seemingly appropriate offsets, was mounted and passed in November (HR 3575; HR 
1724). Two bills were necessary in order to preserve equity among the states, partic-
ularly for those states which would only have received six additional weeks of benefits. 
The president signed both of these bills. The new benefits, costing $5.2 billion, were 
to be paid for by accelerating quarterly tax payments for some high-income taxpayers, 
extending a law allowing the IRS to collect debts owed the government from tax 
refunds, extending the federal unemployment tax at 0.08 percent instead of dropping 
it to 0.06 percent, and garnishing the wages of those defaulting on student loans. 28 
However, CBO estimated these sources ended up $895 million short in FY 1992, 
thus the bill was not fully funded. OMB ruled that this sum would not add to the deficit 
and would therefore not trigger a sequester. 29 In the spring, OMB had also ruled that 
an extension of education benefits to veterans of the Persian Gulf conflict was not an 
entitlement because it came about as a result of a direct appropriation, and thus did not 
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need an offsetting revenue source. 30 In both cases, necessity was the mother of inven-
tion. The dynamics of this struggle are further illustrated in the conflict over the 
emergency provisions governing supplemental appropriations bills. 
SPENDING CONTROL IN EMERGENCY AND 
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS 
A potential weakness in the spending control architecture of the BEA lies in its pro-
vision for emergency appropriations. To allow Congress and the president a means of 
responding relatively quickly to serious problems, while simultaneously retaining the 
overall caps on total spending, the BEA established a new mechanism governing 
emergency funding within supplemental appropriations. Discretionary spending in sup-
plementals would not be scored against total spending allowed for domestic, defense, 
and international programs, provided that both the administration and Congress des-
ignated such spending as an emergency requirement. A similar rule governs emergency 
spending for new entitlement programs and revenue enhancement controlled by the 
BEA's pay-as-you-go requirement. 
The need for joint designation of emergency spending, coupled with spending caps 
and authority to sequester spending that exceeds those caps, has given the OMB a new 
and effective means of blocking spending to which it objects. This new power results 
from the fact that spending not designated as emergency by both branches of govern-
ment will be added to the discretionary spending totals. Regular appropriations bills 
must then be reduced to accommodate the additional spending in supplemental appro-
priations bills not considered emergency by both branches of government. Absent a 
joint designation, the spending caps will be breached, triggering a mini-sequester by 
OMB. 
This new requirement allows OMB to address congressional spending on supple-
mental appropriations bills in a very discrete, and consequently, credible fashion. The 
administration need not threaten to veto an entire supplemental bill and thereby risk 
losing the elements it supports as well as those it opposes. Under the BEA's new rules, 
it may be sufficient to communicate to Congress which measures within an appropri-
ations bill OMB does not consider deserving of the emergency designation. As a House 
GOP aid put it, "it's not an item veto, but it's an item threat. " 31 Thus the BEA 
sequester provisions have "substituted the scalpel for the meat ax. " 32 
If, however, Congress and the administration agree to designate significant amounts 
of supplemental spending as emergencies, the restraint intended by the spending caps 
would be undermined. "Compromise" as one veteran observer of the budget process 
noted, "'may be the greatest potential threat' to the spirit of last year's budget deal. " 33 
OMB's ability to target specific spending provisions within supplemental appropri-
ations bills was first evident in action on HR 1281, a "dire emergency" supplemental 
appropriations bill to pay for indirect costs of the Persian Gulf War and for other 
matters. President Bush requested a total of $3. 7 billion, of which $940 million was to 
be considered emergency spending exempt from the discretionary caps.34 
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The House bill passed on March 7, 1991, totaling $4.1 billion and designating $801 
million as emergency funds. But within this protected amount were several small 
expenditures that OMB had not identified as emergency spending in the request. 
Although the sums were relatively insignificant-$1 million for the United States 
Information Agency and $7.4 million for several Collllllerce Department agencies-the 
confrontation evoked a pointed threat from OMB that a sequester would result if these 
funds were not removed from the bill. The ranking member of the House Budget 
Committee warned his colleagues against abuse of the emergency designation: '' 'The 
Emergency of the Week' has quickly become this year's preferred method to evade 
budget discipline. " 35 
The Senate version of HR 1281 passed on March 20, increased total spending to $4.7 
billion, and increased the emergency programs within the bill to $1,025 million. Where 
the House had added emergency funds for Israel ($650 million), the Senate did the 
same for Turkey ($200 million). The administration, which had requested funds for 
neither, was persuaded to ask for the money and designate it as an emergency require-
ment. 36 The Senate also added funds for dairy price supports, the result of an amend-
ment by Senator Patrick Leahy. OMB expressed its opposition to the dairy appropri-
ation, and the funds were removed in the final bill. 
The administration was largely successful in eliminating what it considered exces-
sive spending under the emergency provision of the BEA in the conference agreement 
on HR 1281, passed on March 23, 1991. The final bill appropriated $4.8 billion, of 
which just over $1.0 billion was jointly designated as emergency spending. 37 The 
difference between the amount the president designated as emergency in his request and 
the amount in the conference agreement was $84 million, in an emergency appropri-
ation of over $1 billion. 
Members of Congress, whose well-intentioned and seemingly innocuous additions to 
earlier versions of HR 1281 had been sliced out by virtue of OMB's veto threat, took 
strong exception to the deletions. Defenders of the excised dairy price supports argued 
that by yielding to the OMB sequester threat, Congress was giving the agency a 
line-item veto over congressional spending proposals. Senator Leahy charged that 
"OMB has by the stroke of a pen put in a line-item veto. " 38 
By refusing to designate certain congressionally favored items as emergency, thereby 
allowing them to escape the spending caps while accepting others, OMB sent a clear 
signal of its willingness to use this new ''rifle shot'' authority to restrain spending. The 
point was later reinforced when OMB sequestered a tiny portion of HR 1281 included 
in the bill by the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Congressman 
Dan Rostenkowski. The final version of HR 1281 shifted $8 million from defense to 
domestic accounts, to be given as a grant to Loyola University of Chicago, the chair-
man's alma mater. OMB warned that this transfer would cause the domestic discre-
tionary spending cap to be breached and force an across-the-board cut against all 
domestic accounts. 39 
When Congress ignored the threat, OMB enforced its first within-session, mini-
sequester under the BEA. Domestic discretionary accounts subject to sequestration 
were cut by a total of $2.4 million across-the-board, reducing programs by 0.0013 
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percent. That this was a political rather than an economic gesture is evident from the 
size of the program reductions. The Department of Energy's geothermal resources 
development fund lost $1; the rewards and operations fund of the Fish and Wildlife 
Service lost $13. 40 A House aide said, "It's like sending you a bill with a 29-cent 
stamp to get you to pay 6 cents. ''41 
OBSERVATIONS 
Some things played out as expected and others did not. The deficit increased. Technical 
corrections were made which increased deficit estimates. However, a growing deficit 
neither dominated nor disrupted the budget process. The emergency spending loophole 
was used, abuses were resisted, and complex scoring and political scrimmages re-
sulted. One technical adjustment lost roughly $130 billion in receipts. Like the deficit 
increase, this error in revenue estimation obviously upset some members of Congress 
but it was a minor perturbation in the budget process. 42 In these aspects, the age of no 
fault budgeting manifested itself. 
The spending targets were apparently met, 43 although some gimmicks were de-
tected, and the unemployment bill might not have been fully paid for as required. 
OMB 's power increased due to its scoring responsibilities and its willingness to threaten, 
and in a single instance, to administer rifle shot vetoes on supplementals. The appro-
priators enjoyed a slight increase in funding for nondefense discretionary accounts for 
FY 1992, but that advantage will be short-lived as the restraint inherent in the caps for 
FY 1993-95 take effect. 
Perhaps the most important event of the year was the disappearance of the Soviet 
Union, following an abortive coup against Gorbachev. This in effect, put the defense 
budget in play if not in a free fall for the coming years, negating the insulation provided 
by the BEA through 1993. Given the significance of the change in the national security 
threat attributed to this event, it is somewhat surprising that the defense cap held, and 
almost inevitable that it will be renegotiated in 1992 absent a dramatic deterioration in 
the security environment. 
The BEA's pay-as-you-go provisions were honored despite great pressure in Con-
gress for further spending. OMB's use of the mini-sequester, or more accurately the 
"micro-sequester" on HR 1281, served notice that this new tool would be used for any 
amount that exceeded the target, no matter how small. The obvious difference between 
mini-sequesters and GRH sequesters is their size and scope. An equally important 
distinction is apparent in the timing of sequestration under BEA compared to GRH. 
GRH sequesters were designed to inflict across-the-board cuts on non-exempt discre-
tionary spending without discriminating among programs. They came into play only at 
the end of the annual budget cycle. A mini-sequester against excessive spending in a 
supplemental appropriations bill is a more credible threat because it comes earlier in the 
year. The fact that it is limited to the offending discretionary spending target-defense, 
domestic, or international-rather than all discretionary accounts, adds credibility. 
Among the surprises has to be the process itself. There was reason to expect that this 
first year would have been timely, but it was not. Only two appropriations bills passed 
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before the end of the fiscal year. Ten passed after the fiscal year had begun, and one, 
foreign operations, was laid over until March 1992. The defense appropriations bill was 
signed on November 26, 1991, marking the end of the 1991 budget process.44 With the 
Budget Resolution in place on May 22, the process was off to its best start since 
1982. 45 But it required three continuing resolutions to conclude a process that went two 
months into the next fiscal year, despite the fact that the targets for the functional areas 
were observed. 46 With this dilatory process, the largest dollar deficit in history, defense 
spending above what many critics felt was warranted by the world situation, and no 
plan in place to curb dramatic long-term growth in mandatory spending, it is difficult 
to label the year a success simply because Congress met the BEA spending targets. 
Another noteworthy outcome of this first year is the extent to which the status quo 
of 1990 was protected. Perhaps one aspect of the budget process that policy analysts 
tend to overlook is the degree to which the budget is shaped by new priorities from year 
to year. The inability to accommodate such new priorities and the failure to contain 
rampant cost growth in entitlement spending may yet prove to be the Achilles heel of 
the BEA. 
The pay-as-you-go requirement affecting entitlement spending provides the most 
telling evidence of this limitation. Priorities can be changed in this portion of the 
budget, but it will not be a pain-free exercise. The requirement was upheld, but neither 
the executive nor Congress made a concerted attempt to respond to new entitlement 
needs by cutting existing ones or raising taxes. Given the fact that most federal spend-
ing lies in this area of the budget, the failure to take up this challenge is significant. 
A relatively small entitlement program was added-$5.2 billion for extended un-
employment benefits-after two time-consuming and extremely contentious failed at-
tempts to provide the benefits without paying for them. The conflict revolved around 
identifying offsets of $5.2 billion within an entitlement budget of $638 billion, a 
rearrangement of0.008 percent within entitlement priorities. It took four months, three 
laws, two funding bills, and one veto to respond to this "urgent" new priority while 
achieving nominal compliance with the pay-as-you-go requirement. 
Finally, it would seem that the impact of the BEA has been tempered by what Fenno 
calls "the grand parameters of budget making-economic conditions and electoral 
proximity.' '47 There was considerable huffing and puffing in 1991, and lots of political 
calories were burned, but there was little apparent movement in either budget policy or 
deficit reduction. It was, in short, an exercise in budgetary isometrics. 
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